PL EN


2008 | 17 | 4(68) | 146-152
Article title

Ontological Commitments

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
Quine's criterion of ontological commitments is probably the best known among his ideas. In the society of analytic philosophers it is often referred to as a brilliant example of how a serious philosophical analysis can cast light on obscure metaphysical matters. According to Quine our theories force us to acknowledge exactly those entities that we allow to be semantic values of our quantified variables. At first sight it sounds well but it turns out that both the impression of its particular clarity as well the hope that it would free us from the traditional metaphysical problems of existence and non-existence are highly exaggerated. In the very first place it is far from clear why Quine's criterion should be regarded as plausible, and even if we take it for granted it is still not obvious what exactly it is intended to say.
Year
Volume
17
Issue
Pages
146-152
Physical description
Document type
ARTICLE
Contributors
  • A. Chrudzimski, Uniwersytet Szczecinski, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Krakowska 71/79, 71-017 Szczecin, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
CEJSH db identifier
09PLAAAA06416
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.c845524f-682a-3945-a3b5-4d8624e6defb
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