Ontological Commitments

• Authors: Chrudzimski A.:
• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

Quine's criterion of ontological commitments is probably the best known among his ideas. In the society of analytic philosophers it is often referred to as a brilliant example of how a serious philosophical analysis can cast light on obscure metaphysical matters. According to Quine our theories force us to acknowledge exactly those entities that we allow to be semantic values of our quantified variables. At first sight it sounds well but it turns out that both the impression of its particular clarity as well the hope that it would free us from the traditional metaphysical problems of existence and non-existence are highly exaggerated. In the very first place it is far from clear why Quine's criterion should be regarded as plausible, and even if we take it for granted it is still not obvious what exactly it is intended to say.

Keywords

EN

ONTOLOGICAL COMMITTMENT'S CRITERION; QUINE WIILARD VAN ORMAN

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Polska Akademia Nauk
• Journal: Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
• Year: 2008
• Volume: 17
• Issue: 4(68)
• Pages: 146-152
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Chrudzimski A.:

• A. Chrudzimski, Uniwersytet Szczecinski, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Krakowska 71/79, 71-017 Szczecin, Poland

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

09PLAAAA06416