EN
The basic part of the article discusses the talks held by the Bandera faction of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-SD) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) with the Germans during the Second World War. The introductory general part of the article indicates factors which proved conducive for such contacts: the presence of more than 350 000 Ukrainians in German formations; the personal contacts between the leadership of OUN-SD/UPA and the Germans; constant collaboration with German Intelligence and police agencies; the limited role of anti-German propaganda and, finally, the fact that assorted Conferences and a Convention never called for an open or larger-scale struggle against the Germans or, in rare cases, mentioned exclusively a 'defensive' struggle. The author presents new information, i.a. the fact that the name 'UPA' was given to the Borovets detachment by the Germans; he also poses such questions as who was the first UPA commander, and synthetically estimates the losses suffered by the Polish population at the hands of the Ukrainian nationalists. The fundamental part of the text states that with the talks in mind OUN-SD and UPA created concrete organisational units in the military staff, and draws attention to the controversial part played by D. Klyachkivskiy. The author discusses formal prohibitions of talks with the Germans at a time when they were actually being conducted. Moreover, he cites a number of examples of talks held at the level of the local commanders (nine rounds), conducted by Father Hrynioch from March to September 1944. The article offers facts testifying that the talks were probably attended by R. Shukhevych. Finally, it questions the thesis that UPA field commanders: 'Sosenko' and Orel, received the death penalty for initiating talks with the Germans, while Maks was forced to desert from the UPA. These verdicts are regarded by Ukrainian researchers as standard examples that OUN-SD and UPA did not become involved in negotiations with the Germans.