Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

PL EN


2010 | 65 | 1 | 12-26

Article title

NA CESTE K VECIAM SAMÝM (K HEIDEGGEROVEJ INTERPRETÁCII HUSSERLOVEJ FENOMENOLÓGIE )

Content

Title variants

EN
On the way to things themselves: Towards the Heideggerian Interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology

Languages of publication

SK

Abstracts

EN
Heidegger's interpretation of Husserl's 'Logical investigations' as presented in his lectures 'History of the concept of time: Prolegomena' (1925) was a remarkable contribution to the development of phenomenology: First, Heidegger starts with the interpretation of intentionality and his considerations become thus methodologically transparent (contrary to the language of 'Being and time', in which the term is missing). Second, Heidegger managed to answer the question: Why is Husserl's phenomenology the philosophically decisive alternative when compared to the domination of reflexive consciousness and logical judgment in modern philosophy? It is because concepts are not the representations of things any more; as the 'states of things' they are explicit expressions ('parts') of an implicitly given meaning ('whole'). Third, Heidegger's interpretation includes the fundamental question of being in its three meanings (copula, the sentence about existence, the sentence about identity), due to which the status of the explanation of 'reality' (which is more than the 'reality' of single things) changes as well.

Year

Volume

65

Issue

1

Pages

12-26

Physical description

Document type

ARTICLE

Contributors

  • Martin Muransky, Filozoficky ustav SAV, Klemensova 19, 813 64 Bratislava 1, Slovak Republic; www.klemens.sav.sk/fiusav/filozofia

References

Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier
10SKAAAA081922

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.c9899e17-a15a-32b4-b5b0-b8bd1b425bc1
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.