EN
Heidegger's interpretation of Husserl's 'Logical investigations' as presented in his lectures 'History of the concept of time: Prolegomena' (1925) was a remarkable contribution to the development of phenomenology: First, Heidegger starts with the interpretation of intentionality and his considerations become thus methodologically transparent (contrary to the language of 'Being and time', in which the term is missing). Second, Heidegger managed to answer the question: Why is Husserl's phenomenology the philosophically decisive alternative when compared to the domination of reflexive consciousness and logical judgment in modern philosophy? It is because concepts are not the representations of things any more; as the 'states of things' they are explicit expressions ('parts') of an implicitly given meaning ('whole'). Third, Heidegger's interpretation includes the fundamental question of being in its three meanings (copula, the sentence about existence, the sentence about identity), due to which the status of the explanation of 'reality' (which is more than the 'reality' of single things) changes as well.