Soudcovské dotváření pravidel dělení důkazního břemena

• Authors: Petr Lavický

Title variants

EN

Judge-making rules of the burden of proof

• Languages of publication: CS

Abstracts

EN

The article deals with the question whether the judge is allowed to depart from the basic rule or specific rules of dividing the burden of proof. The reason for such a procedure can't be justified by the unique circumstances of some/a particular case. However, the judge is not bound to use these rules in the case of a gap in the law. Typically, it will be a situation where the law contains a specific rule of dividing the burden of proof for a particular situation, but without any rational reason, the same rule is not applied to another similar situation. There may be other situations where the literal wording of the law is in contradiction to the teleological background of the civil procedure code of general legal principles (for example the case of impossibility to prove a certain fact). Nevertheless, the reversal of the burden of proof should not occur where the situation can be satisfactorily resolved by other procedural tools, for example by free evaluation of evidence.

Keywords

EN

contentious jurisdiction; law; burden of proof; judge-made law; reversal of the burden of proof; gap in the law; frustration of evidence

Discipline

• LAW_&_ADMINISTRATION: LAW & ADMINISTRATION

• Publisher: Institute of State and Law, Czech Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Právník. Teoretický časopis pro otázky státu a práva (The Lawyer - Scientific Review for Problems of State and Law)
• Year: 2018
• Volume: 157
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 303-319
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Petr Lavický

• Právník, redakce, Ústav státu a práva AV ČR, v.v.i., Národní 18, 116 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic