MIND AND ONTOLOGICAL SPACE. A CRITICAL OUTLINE IN MODAL EPISTEMOLOGY

• Authors: Filipczyk H.
• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

The paper focuses on one of the problems haunting contemporary thought about possible worlds - namely, that of the relation between conceivability and possibility. 'Conceivability arguments' (based on the premise that the conceivability of a given situation implies its possibility) are often used carelessly, not being properly rooted in any explicit and full-fledged ontology. In the paper the reasons that are commonly proposed for the 'liberal' use of 'conceivability arguments' are critically discussed and certain suggestions as to the proper application of such arguments are presented. It is then pointed out that the issue discussed in fact refers to a deeper problem, that of the opposition between combinatorial and combination ontology. The above is also shown to be a modern version of the classical dispute between Descartes and Leibniz. Finally, the authoress presents some general comments on 'modal epistemology'.

Keywords

EN

CONCEIVABILITY - POSSIBILITY RELATIONS; MODAL EPISTEMOLOGY

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Polska Akademia Umiejętności / Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Journal: Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
• Year: 2008
• Volume: 36
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 69-85
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Filipczyk H.

• H. Filipczyk, no address given, contact the journal editor

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

08PLAAAA04568798