Hume o nutnosti, svobodě a odpovědnosti

• Authors: Tomáš Marvan

Title variants

EN

Hume on Necessity, Liberty and Responsibility

• Languages of publication: CS

Abstracts

EN

The paper presents a reconstruction of Hume’s complex argument that takes determinism as a prerequisite for moral evaluation of actions and for the attribution of moral and criminal responsibility for an act. The paper falls into three sections. The first outlines Hume’s “doctrine of necessity”, i. e., his deterministic theory of action, and shows how determinism can be reconciled with the possibility of free action. The second section focuses on Hume’s view of moral judgement and explains how determinism and the denial of free will can be reconciled with the notion of moral responsibility for an act. The last section, devoted to Hume’s ideas about just punishment, canvasses Hume’s hybrid conception of the different purposes of punishment.

Keywords

EN

David Hume; necessity; liberty; responsibility; punishment

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
• Year: 2017
• Volume: 65
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 221-235
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Tomáš Marvan

• Filosofický časopis, redakce, Filosofický ústav AV ČR, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic