EMOTION, INTENTIONALITY AND APPROPRIATENESS OF EMOTION: IN DEFENSE OF A RESPONSE DEPENDENCE THEORY

• Authors: Yang Sunny
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In explaining emotion, there are strong cognitive views, which reduce emotion to belief/thought or judgment. Misgivings about assimilating emotion to belief/thought/judgment have been a main reason for moving towards perceptual accounts for many authors. The author's aim in this paper is to defend a perceptual theory. To this end, he first argues against a crude version of cognitivism that views emotion essentially in terms of thought or belief. He then argues that doubts about the assimilation of emotion to belief explain the appeal of 'perception' as the 'cognitive element' most appropriate to the analysis of emotion. Then he shall discuss why perception is the right category to fit emotional responses into by contrasting some considerations adduced by Sabine Doring and by Jesse Prinz. He shall show that Prinz ignores the perspective aspect of perception, while Doring fails to explain the indiscriminability in perceptual experience. For these reasons, both Prinz's and Doring's views are insufficient to explain emotional recalcitrance or unmerited emotional response. To explain emotional recalcitrance, he argues that we must appeal to a disjunctivist theory of visual experience. He shall demonstrate why we should prefer the explanation in terms of indiscriminability over one which appeals to a common element, such as a thought or representation of something as dangerous, for example. The present critical examination will afford an alternative view of the appropriateness of emotions.

Keywords

EN

DISJUNCTIVISM; DORING SABINE; EMOTIONAL RECALCITRANCE; INDISCRIMINABILITY; PRINZ JESSE

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2009
• Volume: 16
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 82-104
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Yang Sunny

• Sunny Yang, Institute of Philosophy, Seoul National University, South Korea

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

09SKAAAA058317