NESKORÝ WITTGENSTEIN O LOGICKÝCH PRAVIDLÁCH

• Authors: Čana Tomáš

Title variants

EN

The later Wittgenstein on logical rules

• Languages of publication: SK

Abstracts

EN

In his remarks from the late period, Ludwig Wittgenstein is frequently concerned with so-called external roots of our logical operations. He asks questions like: 'How is possible anything like logical necessity?'‚ How is possible anything like following a logical rule under normal circumstances?'‚ Where is the compelling force of a logical proof coming from?'; etc. In the philosophical community, it is generally accepted that the late Wittgenstein's remarks deal with these questions, but the philosophical motivation behind these remarks is still not clear. Instead, there is a growing disagreement among various interpretations over these remarks. The present consideration is built upon the belief that Wittgenstein's remarks try to communicate a new sense to us. The author argues that, contrary to the generally accepted view, there is a new and positive sense in these remarks. His aim in this paper is to clarify the philosophical motivation behind them.

Keywords

EN

CONVENTIONALISM; LOGICAL PROOF; PHILOSOPHY OF LOGIC; SENSE; WITTGENSTEIN

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filozofia (Philosophy)
• Year: 2011
• Volume: 66
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 109-121
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Čana Tomáš

• Mgr. Tomas Cana, PhD., Katedra filozofie FF UCM, Namestie Jana Herdu 2, 917 01 Trnava, Slovak Republic

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

11SKAAAA09578