DO EMOTIONS REPRESENT VALUES BY REGISTERING BODILY CHANGES?

• Authors: Duringer Eva M.
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

This paper outlines Jesse Prinz's theory that emotions represent values by registering bodily changes, discusses two objections, and concludes that Prinz's theory stands in need of modification: while emotions do represent values, they do not do so in the first place by registering bodily changes, but by processing information about how things we care about fare in the world. The function of bodily changes is primarily to motivate and prepare us for action.

Keywords

EN

EMOTION; INTENTIONALITY; PRINZ’S THEORY; TELEOSEMANTICS; VALUE

Discipline

• PHILOSOPHY: PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2009
• Volume: 16
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 62-81
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Duringer Eva M.

• Eva Maria Duringer, Department of Philosophy, University of York, UK

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

09SKAAAA058316