This article is a comparison of two concepts of evil. The first is the concept of dialogical evil in Józef Tischner's philosophy, where the category of betrayal plays an especially important role. The second is to be found in the work of the Israeli philosopher Adi Ophir, who portrays evil as part of what exists and places it within social order. The main issues dealt with in the text are what evil is, where we should place it, and where it is born. The problem of evil in Tischner's philosophy is related to the human way of feeling and perceiving the world, and to the relations between people. Furthermore, it is related to the human mind and the ways it experiences pain or suffering. The main issue for Tischner was how evil is experienced, and how it arises and acts. In contrast, Adi Ophir in his philosophy of evil pays attention mostly to the social order and the order of things. On the one hand, he places evil in order of things, as part of what is there. On the other, he connects evil with social order, with its production and distribution. Ophir shows how evil is created and spread through the social system. He uses the category of superfluity to describe the main quality of evils. His theory refers to the way of evil is thematized as suffering and damage, and to the problems of prevention and compensation. The main issue of the article is the question of what evil is more closely related to – is it the constitution of the self, feelings, thinking, and perceiving, or is it the social order and human relations in a system of exchange. Generally, the thesis presented here is that evil should be the main interest of the moral domain.