PL EN


Journal
2013 | 21 | 1(81) | 113-120
Article title

On E.J. Lowe’s Argument for Brobdingnagian Atomism

Title variants
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
In a number of his essays E.J. Lowe has presented an interesting argument for the ontological simplicity of the self. This argument became the subject of Eric T. Olson’s polemic reaction, who tried – unsuccesfully – to discover a formal mistake in the argument. Eventually, the modified and improved version of Lowe’s reasoning came out in his paper Identity, Composition, and the Simplicity of the Self. It seemed that the argument for the ontological simplicity of the self has resisted criticism. In my paper, I present a few manoeuvres which can be used by advocates of animalism to dismiss conclusions of Lowe’s argument. An animalist may want to do that for a simple reason: on the basis of animalism it is difficult to argue for the thesis of the simplicity of the self, as persons are – according to animalism – human organisms, that is, composite objects. My analysis shows that the simplicity argument – although it remains formally valid – is not sound in the light of the shown difficulties and shortcomings. This enables me to insist on an animalistic interpretation of the subjectaccording to which the self is a composite material object, identical with a living human organism.
Keywords
EN
Journal
Year
Volume
21
Issue
Pages
113-120
Physical description
Contributors
  • Zakład Filozofii Nauki, Wydział Filozofii i Socjologii UW, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-047 Warszawa, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.cejsh-07a03945-3458-46b0-912d-7fae046c3a66
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