PL EN


2016 | 23 | 1 | 72 – 82
Article title

EVIDENCE VS. VIRTUES IN EPISTEMIC DISAGREEMENT

Authors
Content
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
In situations of peer disagreement there are two kinds of factors that matter. These are the factors internal to the discussion, such as evidence exposed and arguments presented by both sides and there are also factors external to the discussion, also called “independent factors”. The external factors include mainly virtues and competences of the participants. There are two main theories about epistemic disagreement, “the stead-fast view” and “the conciliationism”, and each of them stresses the importance of one group of these factors over the other. This paper is a defence of the greater epistemic significance of independent factors over internal factors. However, it is not a defence of the conciliationism which takes independent factors to be systematically the ultimate arbiter in situations of peer disagreement. The argument in the paper goes like this. Although the steadfast view receives strong intuitive support from two cases presented by Thomas Kelly: “Right and Wrong” and “Wrong and Wronger”. The author argues that the view is undermined by Timothy Williamson’s recent “Very Improbable Knowing” argument. This argument shows that for some basic type of evidence E when S uses it in favour of p, it is very improbable that S knows that S knows that p. Therefore, in situations of peer disagreement, S is unjustified to push her evidence in support of her side. There are arguably some exceptions, e.g. when one claims to have knowledge based on a priori evidence and on holistic evidence, but these are not sufficient to save the day for the steadfast view. In contrast to that, the reflective knowledge of one’s first order competences and virtues (i.e. external factors) is not vulnerable by Williamson’s argument. One reason for that is because we know about independent factors on the basis of holistic evidence. The author claims that our epistemic goal in the face of peer disagreement is to end up on the side that is non-accidentally closer to truth. In accordance with achieving this goal, it is safer to stick to independent factors in resolving peer disagreement situations than to follow one’s nose concerning first-order evidence disclosed by the opponents. This might seem a counterintuitive result, which makes it worthy of further discussion.
Contributors
  • Institute for the Study of Societies and Knowledge, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Moskovska Str., 13A, 1000 Sofia, Bulgaria
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.cejsh-0ccfa1b7-0729-4524-beef-27bbdbec9411
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.