Granice redukcji w fenomenologii Husserla a kres filozofii transcendentalnej

• Authors: Monika Trykowska

Title variants

EN

THE LIMITS OF THE REDUCTION IN HUSSERL`S PHENOMENOLOGY AND BOUNDS OF TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

The article considers the evolution of the basic epistemological mechanism of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, the (phenomenological) reduction, in its main variants (the Cartesian way, the way through intentional psychology, the way through ontology). These are further radicalized into the primordial reduction and the reduction to the living present. An analysis of the key assumptions and results of Husserl’s reduction makes it possible to conclude that the most radical, far-reaching version of the reduction (to the living present) may exhaust the philosophical potential of intentional phenomenology. What is left in the area of transcendental philosophy (the philosophy which moves beyond the attitude of “natural objectivism”) are phenomenological positions that resign from the concept of intentionality as the crux of (phenomenological) cognition: Heidegger’s and Henry’s standpoints allow for a critical examination of Husserl’s philosophy from a new perspective, while at the same time opening new vistas for transcendentalism. These positions make it possible to note the limits of Husserl’s method and show that a different kind of reduction is possible.

Keywords

EN

TRANSCENDENTALISM; INTENTIONALITY; PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION

• Publisher: Polska Akademia Umiejętności / Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Journal: Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
• Year: 2010
• Volume: 38
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 25-48

Contributors

author

Monika Trykowska

• Kwartalnik Filozoficzny, Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Instytut Filozofii, ul.Grodzka 52, 31-044 Kraków