PL EN


2013 | 20 | suppl. 1 | 44 – 63
Article title

EVOLUČNÍ ARGUMENT A SPOR O REALISMUS

Content
Title variants
EN
Evolutionary argument and the realism dispute
Languages of publication
CS
Abstracts
EN
The Evolutionary Argument (EA) plays the central role in the realism-antirealism dispute. Proponents of this argument maintain that evolutionary theory provides a convincing evidence for the reliability of our cognitive capacities. The evolutionary function of these capacities is to inform us about the character of our environment; and, as evidenced by the survival of our species, we can surmise that our cognitive capacities tend to provide a true, rather than false, picture of the world (cf., e.g., Quine, Kornblith, Munz). However, opponents of this view argue that evolutionary processes are not exclusively adaptive or optimal; indeed, some processes may not be adaptive at all (cf., e.g., Putnam, van Fraassen, Stich, and Bradie). Some of these critics, e.g., Thomson, believe that evolutionary theory demonstrates that our knowledge is not true, and that our cognitive capacities are not only fallible but completely unreliable. They produce only one of the many possible pictures of the world. The author criticizes this type of argument by means of a non-adaptation interpretation of evolutionary theory (Wuketits), and he is seeking an evolutionary way out.
Contributors
  • Oddělení analytické filozofie, Filozofický ústav, Akademie věd České republiky, v.v.i., Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic, havlik@flu.cas.cz
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.cejsh-0e2030dc-0b7a-4ce7-bf46-fa97b17ae5a9
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