2018 | 13 | 167-190
Article title

The Accuracy of Symmetric Negotiation Support Based on Scoring Systems Built by Holistic Approach and Direct Rating

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In negotiations, the parties can be offered decision support based on formal scoring systems. These systems can be determined by means of various preference elicitation techniques and multiple criteria decision aiding (MCDA) approaches. In most situations the simplest tool is used, namely the direct rating technique (DR). In this paper we analyze to what extent the scoring system obtained by means of a mix of MARS (Measuring Attractiveness near Reference Solutions) and UTASTAR (Utilités Additives) holistic preference elicitation approaches accurately reflects the negotiator’s preferences; and how much its potential inaccuracy may affect the symmetric support given to the parties. We compare the differences in the recommendation of Nash bargaining solutions offered to the parties when the bargaining analysis is determined by means of holistic and DR approaches and analyze which of them misrepresent the actual negotiation situation more. The results show that there are no significant differences when the quality of average recommendations are compared, yet the DR-based scoring system recommends the true Nash bargaining solution for more negotiation instances than the holistic one does.
Physical description
  • University of Economics in Katowice. Faculty of Informatics and Communication. Department of Operations Research, Katowice, Poland
  • University of Bialystok. Faculty of Economic and Management, Bialystok, Poland
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