CONCEPTS MAY STILL BE OBJECTS

• Authors: Noonan Harold
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In his book (2021) Trueman attempts to provide a solution to the problem of the concept horse, which according to Frege’s published writings is an object, not a concept. In the course of doing so Trueman rejects Wright’s response (1998) according to which some objects are also concepts, for example, the concept horse, so the categories are not exclusive. Trueman’s argument for exclusivity (Chapter 4) is the heart of the book, and as he says, it is his response to holders of differing views, like Wright. I think that there is a gap in Trueman’s argument which needs to be filled if Wright is to be considered refuted.

Keywords

EN

CONCEPT; OBJET; WRIGHT; SINGULAR TERM; FREGE

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2022
• Volume: 29
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 376 – 388

Contributors

author

Noonan Harold

• University of Nottingham, Department of Philosophy, Room C41 Humanities, University Park, Nottingham, NG7 2RD, United Kingdom

• https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5538-5444

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29304