Reprezentacja, milczenie, inny. Od samowiedzy przedmiotowej do samoświadomości transcendentalnej w psychologii opisowej Franza Brentany

• Authors: Moroz Kamil

Title variants

EN

REPRESENTATION, SILENCE, THE OTHER. FROM OBJECTIVE SELF-KNOWLEDGE TO TRANSCENDENTAL SELF-AWARENESS IN FRANZ BRENTANO'S DESCRIPTIVE PSYCHOLOGY

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

In this paper I use the distinction between self-consciousness as an object of expe-rience and self-consciousness as the subject of experience proposed in Peter-Rudolf Horstmann's article „The Limited Significance of Self-Consciousness" in order to analyse Franz Brentano's descriptive psychology. The result of this analysis can be expressed in three theses: 1) Every self-consciousness is the consciousness of another self-consciousness. If there is self-consciousness, we have the essential conditions for it to know another self-consciousness. 2) Every self-knowledge is knowledge about another self-knowledge. I cannot know anything about myself which could not lead to knowledge about another. Even if the self-knowledge is not propositional, it is not an exclusive and unique fact. 3) Every objective self-knowledge is also non-objective self-knowledge. Selfconsciousness cannot be reduced to empirically tested features because it is always something more.

Keywords

EN

EXPERIENCE; CONSCIOUSNESS; SELF-CONSCIOUSNES; SELF-KNOWLEDGE

• Publisher: Polska Akademia Umiejętności / Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Journal: Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
• Year: 2013
• Volume: 41
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 5 - 23

Contributors

author

Moroz Kamil

• Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Grodzka 52, 31 - 044 Kraków, Poland