VEDOU VYŠŠÍ VÝDAJE NA ÚŘEDNÍKA K NIŽŠÍMU RIZIKU KORUPCE? ANALÝZA ČESKÝCH KRAJŮ

• Authors: Půček Milan

Title variants

EN

Do higher expenditures on civil servants lead to a reduced corruption risk? Analysis of Czech regions

• Languages of publication: CS

Abstracts

EN

This paper has two objectives: (1) to propose an approach to corruption risk assessment with the FMEA (Fault Mode and Effect Analysis) method and verify it on a case study (taking decisions on monument protection in the Czech Republic), and (2) to find out whether higher salary expenditures per civil servant reduce corruption risk. The paper works with the principal-agent theory and the NPM (New Public Management) concept. Results of the research point out that an increase in staff expenditures does not automatically reduce corruption. What needs to go side by side is also higher quality of institutions themselves. Correlation between resistance against corruption and higher salary has not been proven.

Keywords

EN

CORRUPTION; CZECH REPUBLIC; CORRUPTION RISK; AGENT; FMEA; SALARY

• Publisher: Institute of Slovak and World Economics and Institute for Forecasting, Slovak Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Ekonomický časopis (Journal of Economics)
• Year: 2014
• Volume: 62
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 150 – 166

Contributors

author

Půček Milan

• Karlova univerzita v Praze, Fakulta sociálních věd, Centrum pro sociální a ekonomické strategie, Celetná 20, 116 36 Praha 1, Czech Republic