EN
The article attempts to investigate the essence of imagination by questioning the status of imagined objects. The author refers to Husserl’s concept of imagination as a form of consciousness that functions by presenting its object as imagined, i.e., as absent. Although Husserl formulated at least two theories of non-existent objects, his descriptions of imagination – states the author – are only partial, since he did not describe the noematical aspect of consciousness. In this context, Ingarden’s ontology provides useful tools for describing the imagined object as a purely intentional object. The author claims that Ingarden’s analysis of fiction can serve to supplement Husserl’s phenomenology of imagination. In this context, Blaustein seems to bind both perspectives – noetic and noematic – by indicating a transcendent content as a necessary element of any act of imagining. On this basis, the author defines the conditions of identity for imagined objects.