BRUNERO’S NON-NORMATIVE DISJUNCTIVISM AND MEANS-ENDS REASONING

• Authors: Lee Byeong D.
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

On Brunero’s non-normative disjunctivism, agents exhibiting means-ends incoherence are irrational because they are guaranteed to have at least one attitude that fails to achieve its constitutive aim, and such an aim failure is not a failure of reason. This paper primarily aims to show that this account fails to adequately explain the irrationality of means-ends incoherence. More specifically, I argue that agents exhibiting this incoherence can be justifiably criticized for irrationality, and they cannot ward off such criticism by claiming that there is no reason to be means-ends coherent. Furthermore, I argue that Brunero’s three objections to the strong normativity of means-ends coherence are not successful.

Keywords

EN

INCOHERENCE; REASONING; CONSTITUTIVISM; NON-NORMATIVE DISJUNCTIVISM; BRUNERO

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2025
• Volume: 32
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 323 – 347

Contributors

author

Lee Byeong D.

• Department of Philosophy, Sungkyunkwan University, 25-2, Sungkyunkwan-ro, Jongno-gu, Seoul, Republic of Korea

• https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7080-6702

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2025.32303