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“AN INTERNAL MATTER FOR THE SOVIET UNION”. THE ATTITUDE OF THE POLISH EMBASSY IN MOSCOW TOWARDS PROBLEMS WITH CHANGING THE CITIZENSHIP OF POLISH REPATRIATES FROM THE DEPTHS OF THE SOVIET UNION IN 1945¹

ABSTRACT: After concluding the Polish-Soviet repatriation agreement (6 July 1945), the Soviet Union (the USSR) started preparing for the evacuation of Polish exiles: victims of the Soviet deportation from the years 1940–1941. It soon became apparent that those who wanted to return to Poland were required to undergo the procedure of changing citizenship. The exiles had to prove they had been Polish citizens prior to 17 September 1939. The majority of them did not have the documents that could confirm this, thus, the planned repatriation was under threat. In the autumn of 1945, the Polish Embassy in Moscow took action to make the procedure of changing citizenship easier, and finally mass repatriation began.

KEYWORDS: Polish exiles in the USSR; repatriation; Polish Embassy in Moscow; Polish-Soviet relations in 1945

The Soviet invasion of Poland on 17 September 1939 resulted in the massive repression of its citizens. Many Poles, Jews, Belarusians, and Ukrainians were deported to remote parts of the Soviet Union (the USSR). It is estimated that the number of victims of the Soviet deportation from the years 1940-1941 exceeded 320 thousand. The destinations of the special trains were distant areas of the European part of Russia, Siberia, and Kazakhstan (Głowacki 2009, 238-246).

The Kremlin, in the diplomatic note of 17 September 1939 to the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, Waław Grzybowski, “justified” the Red Army crossing the border with Poland by the collapse of the Polish state (“the Polish State and its Government have, in fact, ceased to exist”) (Gieysztor et al. 1995, 74-75). The result of that position was the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the

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USSR of 29 November 1939 on the imposition of Soviet citizenship on all people living in Western Belarus and Western Ukraine: Polish territories annexed by the Soviets. That decision had political implications for the relations between Poland and the Soviet Union in the years 1941-1943. The Soviet interpretation of the issue of Polish citizenship after the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Polish government in London was the core of the political crisis between Poland and the USSR. At the beginning of 1943, the Soviet authorities once again imposed Soviet citizenship on Polish exiles staying in the USSR after the evacuation of Władysław Anders' army (Głowacki 1990, 33-43).

After severing diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Poland in April 1943, the only representative of Polish exiles in the depths of the USSR was the Union of Polish Patriots (Związek Patriotów Polskich – ZPP) – established in June 1943 and controlled by Stalin's regime. The formation of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego, PKWN) in 1944 initiated a new chapter, both in Polish-Soviet relations and the history of Poland. The head of ZPP – Wanda Wasilewska – in July 1944 became the vice-chairwoman of PKWN. The Committee announced changes to the Polish borders, economy, domestic and foreign policy and, above all, the alliance with the Soviet Union. The policy of the PKWN was controlled by the Soviets. On 26 June 1944, an agreement with the Soviet headquarters of the Red Army concerning relations between the Polish and Soviet administrations in the liberated territories of Poland was concluded. In fact, it allowed for the arrest and deportation of Polish citizens living in the frontline area. The following day, the PKWN reached yet another agreement with the Kremlin, pertaining to the eastern borders of Poland; the Polish Eastern Borderlands (Kresy Wschodnie) were ceded to the USSR (Noskova 2005, 31-49).

Meanwhile, on 22 June and 14 July 1944, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of USSR decided to grant Polish citizenship to Polish soldiers (and their families) who had originated from eastern Poland. The same right was also given to other people involved in the fight against Nazi Germany. Regrettably, those decisions proved to be applicable only in theory. The Soviet government did not take any steps to implement them in practice (AMSZ: sign. 6-30-461, p. 91; Marciniak 2013, 115-116).

However, in September 1944, the PKWN concluded agreements with the Soviet Belarus, Ukraine, and Lithuania regarding the resettlement of Poles from the eastern districts of the Second Republic of Poland. They were a part of the de-polonization process of those areas. It must be emphasized that it was not repatriation, but simply resettlement. Poles from Kresy Wschodnie (Eastern Borderlands) did not come back to their "homeland", so they were not repatriated. It might be said that their homeland had left them due to the alteration of Poland's eastern borders (Przesiedlenie 1999, 13-17, 55-61).

In the autumn of 1944, the PKWN administration was aware of the problem related to the necessity to properly regulate the legal status of the citizens of the Second Republic of Poland who found themselves, against their will, in the USSR. Mainly, they were wartime exiles, victims of the 1940-1941 deportations. The Soviet authorities categorized those Poles as Soviet citizens. The PKWN administration estimated their number (according the ZPP's data) at over 270,000 and considered it necessary to repatriate them to Poland (AMSZ: sign. 27-2-24, pp. 42-46). One month after concluding the resettlement agreements, the PKWN Legal Office gave a special opinion on the issue of Polish citizenship in relation to the Soviet government. Its author suggested the need for concluding the Polish-Soviet agreement concerning citizenship, even if the mass repatriation of Poles from the distant parts of the USSR was still unviable. Moreover, Poles in prisons and labour camps in the USSR could not take advantage of the amnesty of 10 August 1944 as it was only meant for Polish citizens. Meanwhile, a large number of Poles in the USSR were Soviet citizens. For the same reason, the Soviets rejected issuing visas to those from among them who were being summoned by the PKWN administration (AMSZ: sign. 27-2-24, pp. 40-41).

Needless to say, for political reasons and due to the "Polish-Soviet friendship", repressions remained unmentioned at the time. Another important matter was the interpretation of the 1920 Polish Citizenship Act. It prohibited from becoming a citizen of another state, joining a foreign army, or its legal office. Meanwhile, in the autumn of 1939, the Soviet authorities on the annexed Polish territories forced Poles to accept Soviet citizenship. Moreover, many of them had been enrolled in the Red Army against their will. Therefore, in the opinion of the PKWN Legal Office, there was a kind of a legal deadlock over the issue of the citizenship of Poles in the USSR, for if they were to "voluntarily" accept Soviet citizenship or "voluntarily" join the Red Army, then, in the light of the Polish law, they could be regarded as "unworthy" of belonging to the Polish state. In the meantime, the question of their citizenship was critical to solving various repatriation problems. As the PKWN was completely dependent on the Kremlin, it could not raise those issues with the Soviet authorities (AMSZ: sign. 27-2-24, p. 41; Journal of Laws of the Republic of Poland, 7 (1920), item 44).

In August 1944, a representation of the PKWN in Moscow started cooperating with its head, Stefan Jędrychowski. Shortly afterwards he tried to persuade the Soviet government to conclude the agreement on the regulation of the legal status of Polish exiles in the depths of the Soviet territory (Russia, Siberia, Eastern Ukraine, Central Asia). He inquired Vyacheslav Molotov about the individual repatriation of some Poles from the interior of the Soviet Union (those arrested in Lviv, Poles in labour camps and mobilized in the Red Army, the families of PKWN's clerks). After the initial talks, the Soviet minister refused. The Soviet authorities would not agree

to regulate the legal status of Polish exiles, labour camp workers, and prisoners, let alone arrange their mass repatriation (AMSZ: sign. 27-2-15, pp. 14-16, 37).

In the autumn of 1944, Jędrychowski signalled to the PKWN administration the necessity of restoring Polish citizenship to Poles in the USSR. He also raised the question of establishing a network of Polish consulates in the Soviet Union as well as individual repatriation. However, the Kremlin rejected those ideas in practice. Despite that some Poles were eventually able to return to Poland late into 1944 (AMSZ: sign. 27-2-15, p. 35; Jędrychowski 1987, 67-69, 75).

In December 1944, the PKWN was reconstituted as the Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland. At the beginning of 1945, the PKWN mission in Moscow was transformed into the Polish Embassy. Before long, its head – Zygmunt Modzelewski – entered into negotiations with the Soviet authorities on an agreement allowing the repatriation of the Polish population from the depths of the USSR: mostly victims of the 1940-1941 deportations. On 6 March 1945, Modzelewski sent a request to Warsaw to approve the commencement of official negotiations concerning the future agreement. The Polish Ambassador proposed to establish the “General Polish-Soviet Joint Committee on Repatriation Issues”. Those inter-governmental authorities would have broad powers to grant Polish citizenship. The Committee’s principal right would be to decide if a given person should be granted Polish citizenship and the right to repatriation or not. It is worth noting that the local Polish proxies of the Joint Committee would play their role in Polish consulate agencies. It was a very bold concept and met with the Kremlin’s opposition as Moscow considered all the changes in the legal status of Poles residing in the USSR as an exclusively Soviet prerogative (AMSZ: sign. 27-10-155, pp. 1-7).

In the spring of 1945, Ambassador Modzelewski participated in the talks with the officials of the Soviet foreign ministry pertaining to repatriation and citizenship. He sent a few drafts of the repatriation agreement to the Soviets. Aleksander Juszkiewicz (secretary of the General Board of the Union of Polish Patriots in USSR – ZPP) was also involved in the work on them. Modzelewski and Juszkiewicz proposed to the Soviets that Polish citizenship should be restored to Polish exiles as soon as they succeeded in the procedure of changing citizenship (called *opcja*). Moreover, they suggested taking into account any documents they possessed. It appears that Modzelewski and Juszkiewicz predicted difficulties with reinstating Polish citizenship to Siberian exiles (AMSZ: sign. 27-10-155, pp. 15-31, 33-38, 40-47).

However, the proposals presented by Ambassador Modzelewski were rejected by the Soviet authorities. They were written excluding Polish solutions. *The final version* of the agreement was signed on 6 July 1945 by Zygmunt Modzelewski and Andrey Vyshinsky (Deputy Foreign Minister). As a document giving the right to repatriation and to change citizenship provided to the Polish exiles it included a formal possibility of returning to their homeland. In practice, the Soviets made

it even more difficult. The most important problem with the implementation of the repatriation agreement, and the principal obstacle in reclaiming Polish citizenship on the part of exiles, were unrealistic deadlines and the Soviet position on rules of the *opcja* procedure. The agreement concerned only the citizens of the Second Republic of Poland who had been deported to the USSR between the years 1939-1941 and regulated the manner and terms of the planned repatriation. The right to go to Poland was granted only to people of Polish and Jewish ethnicity: Polish citizens until 17 September 1939. Exiles – citizens of the Second Polish Republic of Belarusian, Lithuanian, Russian and Ukrainian ethnicity as well as those Poles and Jews who, under Soviet pressure, had declared any other nationality were forced to stay in the USSR (Dokumenty i materiały 1974, 500-505)

According to the agreement, the path to repatriation seemed uncomplicated. Polish and Jewish exiles were to apply for a change of citizenship (from Soviet to Polish) to the committee on the citizenship of the Presidium of Supreme Soviet by 1 November 1945. The document provided for voluntary submission was to be executed by 1 November 1945. The successful procedure for changing citizenship gave a person the right to participate in the organized repatriation, which was supposed to be completed by 31 December 1945. It soon became apparent that the deadlines were impossible to maintain. Moreover, the Soviets claimed that the issue of Polish citizenship was “an internal matter for the USSR” (Polska Delegacja 2016, 21-23).

The agreement established the Polish-Soviet Joint Committee on Evacuation for the coordination of the repatriation, yet no procedure for changing citizenship. The decision to restore Polish citizenship to Poles in the USSR belonged exclusively to the Soviet authorities. Even members of the Polish delegation to the Joint Committee were Soviet citizens, with no empowerment to issue citizenship to exiles (Polska Delegacja 2016, 31-38).

In the autumn of 1945, the procedure of changing citizenship commenced, nevertheless, it was stopped after a few weeks. Most of the exiles did not have the documents that could confirm they had been Polish citizens before 17 September 1939. Thus, their applications were rejected without being processed. Not possessing adequate documents practically equalled no right to repatriation. “Evidence of being Polish” was required by the Soviet militia as well. According to the instructions of the Soviet delegation to the Joint Committee, valid documents included an identification card, an office/army certificate, a university degree certificate, a school report, or a birth certificate. The situation seemed peculiar: the exiles had to prove to the Soviet authorities that they had Polish citizenship. This very authority had deprived them of their Polish citizenship and deported them into the interior of the USSR. Consequently, many of them gave up hope of returning to Poland (Polska Delegacja 2016, 31-33).

Meanwhile, Warsaw sent a new Polish ambassador to Moscow. On 20 August 1945, Bolesław Bierut appointed Professor Henryk Raabe, who came to the USSR and promptly began his official duties. He was not a professional diplomat, namely a scientist (zoologist), social activist and a member of the Polish Socialist Party. It appears that Raabe was supposed to act as a puppet, however, he refused to play that role and quickly showed great determination in enabling repatriation not only of the war-time exiles but also of those from among the Polish citizens who arrived in the USSR after the end of the war. The activities of the Polish Embassy in Moscow at that time, the legal situation of various groups of Poles, including exiles, inmates of forced labour camps, prisoners, as well as the prospects for their repatriation were the key issues. In the years 1945-1946, during talks with the Soviet authorities, Polish diplomats raised the question of Poles in the USSR. Nonetheless, those Poles – since they were holders of Soviet passports – were not formally under the protection of the Moscow Embassy. Even some members of its staff, actively involved in repatriation matters, were citizens of the USSR.²

In the autumn of 1945, Raabe held a series of meetings with Soviet diplomats. He talked with Viatcheslav Molotov, Andrey Vyshinsky, and Alexei Pavlov (the head of the Fourth European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry). He tried to convince the Soviets to change the rules of the *opcja* procedure. The Polish ambassador explained problems regarding the change of citizenship of exiles and proposed various solutions; his activity was supported by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Polish Embassy sent numerous diplomatic notes to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, containing information about problems with the *opcja* procedure. In the reports and letters to Warsaw, Henryk Raabe and Henryk Wolpe (Chairman of the Polish Delegation of the Polish-Soviet Joint Committee on Evacuation) pointed out ways of resolving the crisis. After approval, the proposals on the part of the Polish government were submitted to the Soviets. Raabe and Wolpe suggested that the documents should be considered with less “official value”, such as various certificates, letters, medical notes, and even photos. Notwithstanding, the Polish solutions were rejected by the Kremlin (AMSZ: sign. 6-29-447, pp. 1-8; sign. 6-30-452, pp. 1-2, 6; sign. 22-10-246, p. 5; sign. 27-10-155, pp. 102-104).

As time progressed the completion date for repatriation was approaching. Despite numerous difficulties, Raabe was persistent in trying to have an impact on the Soviet attitude towards repatriation. The issue of changing citizenship threatened the implementation of the repatriation agreement, yet it was not the only problem. Moscow disagreed to appoint proxies of the Joint Committee in the districts where exiles were concentrated. Raabe emphasized that while the *opcja* procedure was still in progress, this could significantly accelerate and facilitate the preparations for the repatriation. Even so, the Soviets ignored those arguments.

² Regarding the activity of the Polish Embassy in Moscow on the restoration of Polish citizenship and repatriation of exiles from the depths of the USSR see: Marciniak 2021, 110-129.

The problems with changing citizenship and the uncertainty of repatriation frustrated and disappointed the exiles. Many of them believed that the announced organized repatriation would never take place. Some of them even considered leaving the USSR for Poland on their own. They looked for various ways of escaping from the places of their exile and of reaching the former eastern parts of the Second Republic of Poland, from where they could go to Poland within its new borders. Poles and Jews from the depths of the USSR used the permission to resettle to Western Belarus, Western Ukraine, or Lithuania to flee. Those unable obtain the permission, decided to flee; they travelled by hiding on trains. It was extremely dangerous, both because of the peril involved as well as being penalized (AMSZ: sign. 6-32-502, pp. 13a-14; AAN, ZPP: sign. 75, p. 61; sign. 118, pp. 28-29; sign. 1164, p. 58; sign. 1334, p. 94; sign. 1481, p. 305; sign. 1483, pp. 61-62).

1 November 1945 was the deadline for submitting application forms to change citizenship by the exiles. According to the NKVD data, only a small number of the forms were considered positively. On 9 November 1945, Vyshinsky handed the draft of the decision of the All-Union Communist Party on “The way of resettling the former Polish citizens of Polish and Jewish ethnicity to Poland and renouncing Soviet citizenship by them” to Beria. A day later, it was accepted by the authorities of the Bolshevik party and by the Soviet government. The decision contained the prolongation of the *opcja* deadline until 1 January 1946 and the repatriation until 15 June 1946. Following it, local organs of the militia receiving applications for a change of citizenship were given a new instruction. From that moment onwards, all the applications from the exiles of Polish and Jewish ethnicity – Polish citizens until 17 September 1939 – were to be approved, even if the exiles had no documents as evidence of being pre-war Polish citizens (Przemieszczenie 1999, 306-311).

It is worth adding that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, on 10 November 1945, decided that the repatriates would gain Polish citizenship on leaving the Soviet Union rather than as a result of undergoing the *opcja* procedure successfully (Bugaj 1994, 122-123).

Consequently, Soviet authorities’ decision on changing the repatriation terms and simplifying the procedure of reinstating citizenship, the agreement of 6 July 1945 was supplemented with an additional protocol. It was signed by Raabe and Vyshinsky on 20 November 1945, nevertheless, dated 11 November (Polska Delegacja 2016, 10).

In February 1946, the first repatriation transports departed from the USSR’s interior. In total, more than a quarter of a million war-time exiles had returned to Poland in an organized way by July 1946. In the summer of 1946, the Soviet authorities declared the repatriation based on the agreement of 6 July 1945 to be completed. Even so, a great many exiles had no chance to benefit from the possibility of reaching Poland. According to the Polish Embassy data from the autumn of 1946, approximately 4 thousand exiles did not take a part in the mass repatriation because the Soviet authorities rejected their *opcja* applications or for other reasons (AMSZ: sign. 27-15-255, pp. 6-7).

Henryk Raabe still tried to re-open mass repatriation. Moreover, he strove for the implementation of the Soviet amnesty for Poles detained in prisons and labour camps. In December 1945 and March 1946, ambassador Raabe wrote two reports on the problems with repatriation that multitudinous groups of Poles in the USSR experienced. He suggested practical solutions regarding their issues with citizenship. The following categories of Poles were primarily of interest to the Polish Embassy in Moscow: displaced persons, prisoners, forced labour camp inmates from central Poland and areas annexed by the USSR (mainly soldiers of the Home Army), people qualified for “repatriation” and arrested in the Eastern Borderlands of the Second Republic of Poland, people who had decided to stay in their current place of residence, people conscripted into the Red Army, people who had been demobilized, deported Silesians, Mazurians, Kashubians, Warmians, repressed Anders’ Army soldiers, those who were arrested in the USSR after 1943, inhabitants of the Baltic republics annexed to the USSR who were Polish, as well as free persons, students, children separated from their parents during the Soviet and German occupations, and wartime exiles. The legal status and the opportunity of returning Poles deprived of liberty and those free ones (as potential participants of official resettlement actions) to their homeland were an extremely important part of the activity of the Polish Embassy in the years 1945-1946 (Marciniak 2016, 167-178).

Having Soviet citizenship made it difficult for numerous Poles to apply for release and repatriation. They wrote many letters to the Embassy asking for help, and the Embassy intervened with the Soviet authorities. Henryk Raabe brought up their problems during talks with the Soviets and reports to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Regrettably, the determination of the Ambassador was undesirable both in Moscow and Warsaw. In 1946 – after the mass repatriation of war exiles finished – the Soviet authorities insisted on his removal from the post. Hence, Raabe was dismissed in September 1946. When he left, an inspection of the Embassy was carried out by a commission of the Polish Labour Party, being the first sign of Stalinization in Polish post-war diplomacy. The report advised exchanging the staff with “reliable” people who would serve as a facade (AAN, KRN: sign. 856, pp. 183-188).

In the years 1946-1947, the Polish Delegation to the Joint Committee tried to re-open repatriation, however, the Soviets opposed. In turn, in the years 1947-1948, the Polish Embassy in Moscow officially denied repatriation to Polish citizens living in the Soviet Union, except for diplomats and students (Marciniak 2017, 187-196). Nonetheless, at the same time, the government in Warsaw analyzed the Polish-Soviet repatriation and resettlement agreements and worked at the first post-war Citizenship Law (1951). That very important issue was the interpretation of the rules for gaining Polish citizenship on the grounds of the above mentioned agreements. The conclusions were included in the Polish-Soviet Convention on the Regulation of the Citizenship of Persons with Dual Citizenship (1958) and the Convention on the Prevention of Cases of Dual Nationality (1965).

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