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2011 | 18 | 4 | 423 – 446
Article title

NATURE OF ASSERTORY FORCE AND THE TRUTH IN LOGIC: AN ELUCIDATION OF FREGEAN TRUTH IN THE LIGHT OF HUSSERL’S THEORY OF DOXIC-MODIFICATION

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EN
Abstracts
EN
The unique relation between logic and truth (proto-relation) is crucial for understanding Fregean conception of logic. Frege has an insight that the nature of logic resides in the “truth“, which he finally locates in the assertory force of a sentence. Though Frege admits that assertory force is ineffable in ordinary language, he coins in his conceptual notation for such a force a much-disputed sign, i.e., judgment-stroke. In this paper, author will try to demonstrate that judgment-stroke is not adequate for the task its inventor has assigned to it. Accordingly, it is misconceived and inconducive to clarify Frege’s vague insight into the proto-relation. The mistake of judgment-stroke for the sign of assertory force has its root in Frege’s ignorance of the significant difference between “judgment” and “assertion”, which will be elucidated at length in the light of Husserl’s theory of “doxic-modification“. In the end, based on a further elucidation of the activity of assertion, he will advance a tentative interpretation of the vague insight Frege has concerning the proto-relation.
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author
  • Department of Philosophy, School of Liberal Arts, Tongji University, 1239 Siping Road, 200092 Shanghai, China, gaosongsemasia@gmail.com
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bwmeta1.element.cejsh-39ae1a57-7daa-4219-965d-08d51b6c13a7
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