Three Welfare Orderings that are Fully Comparable Revisited
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We are concerned with welfare orderings on the set of evaluation vectors. In our framework the number of agents, criteria or states of nature is fixed and an evaluation vector assigns a real valued evaluation to each criteria, agent or state of nature. Hence the space of evaluation vectors is a finite dimensional Euclidean space. In such a context we provide axiomatic characterizations of the utilitarian, maximin and leximin welfare orderings. The axiomatic characterization of the utilitarian welfare ordering is based on a quasi-linearity property. The axiomatic characterizations of the maximin and leximin welfare orderings are obtained by suitably modifying the axioms used by Barbera and Jackson (1988).
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