TEÓRIE EMÓCIÍ A FIKCIA

• Authors: Juraj Hvorecký

Title variants

EN

Theories of emotions and fiction

• Languages of publication: SK

Abstracts

EN

Philosophical theories of emotions have problems in explaining emotional reactions to fictitious events. We demonstrate the problem of all propositional theories and suggest a solution that is based on a perceptual account. We illustrate the problems of propositional theories by pointing out logical inconsistencies, as well as unclarities with the immediacy of emotional reactions to fiction. We explain how perceptual account, enriched by a specific form of intentionality, offers an elegant solution to the basic problem of coordination between an occurrence of emotion and belief about its fictitious origin. By the way of concluding we point it as still unresolved issues.

Keywords

EN

THEORY OF EMOTIONS; FICTION

• Publisher: Institute of World Literature, Slovak Academy of Sciences
• Journal: World Literature Studies
• Year: 2011
• Volume: 3 (20)
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 53 – 61

Contributors

author

Juraj Hvorecký

• Filosofický ústav AV ČR, Jilská 1, 110 00Praha 1, Czech Republic