REMOVING AN INCONSISTENCY FROM JAGO’S THEORY OF TRUTH

• Authors: Davies Nathan William
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

I identify an inconsistency in Jago’s theory of truth. I show that Jago is committed to the identity of the proposition that the proposition that A is true and the proposition that A. I show that Jago is committed to the proposition that A being true because A if the proposition that A is true. I show that these two commitments, given the rest of Jago’s theory, entail a contradiction. I show that while the latter commitment follows from Jago’s theory of truth, even by Jago’s own lights he should not be committed to the identity of the proposition that the proposition that A is true and the proposition that A.

Keywords

EN

TRUTH; TRUTHMAKING; JAGO; PROPOSITION

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2023
• Volume: 30
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 339 – 349

Contributors

author

Davies Nathan William

• Kenilworth, United Kingdom

• https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4636-9201

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2023.30403