Andrzej Półtawski o fenomenologii asubiektywnej Jana Patočki: analiza krytyczna i próba zestawienia

• Authors: Płotka Witold

Title variants

EN

Andrzej Półtawski on Jan Patočka’s asubjective phenomenology: critical analysis and juxtaposition

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

The article examines Półtawski’s reading of Patočka’s concept of asubjective phenomenology as presented in § 24 of the 1973 book Świat, spostrzeżenie, świadomość [The World, Perception, Consciousness]. The author discusses the main points of Patočka’s philosophy, especially his views on Husserl. For Patočka, phenomenology consists in a systematic analysis of whatever presents itself in experience. The method which problematizes the manifestation of phenomena is epoché. But the theory of transcendental reduction reduces phenomena to mere subjective appearances. For this reason, phenomenology should be pursued as an “a-subjective” project. Półtawski claims that Patočka is right in criticizing Husserl for falling into Cartesianism, but that he fails in defining the “phenomenal sphere” as the main subject matter of phenomenology. Półtawski holds that Patočka in fact continues the dogmatic motif of Husserl’ phenomenology and, moreover, that he reduces phenomena to their subjective being. The author analyzes Półtawski’s reading and claims that it has some limitations, including a misinterpretation of Patočka’s epoché, or the emphasis put on metaphysical claims of phenomenology.

Keywords

EN

phenomenal field; reduction, dogmatism; asubjective phenomenology; Jan Patočka; Andrzej Półtawski

• Publisher: Polska Akademia Umiejętności / Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Journal: Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
• Year: 2020
• Volume: 48
• Issue: 1-2
• Pages: 51-68

Contributors

author

Płotka Witold

• Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego, Instytut Filozofii, ul. Dewajtis 5, 01-815 Warszawa, Poland