PL EN


Journal
2011 | 19 | 4(76) | 43-53
Article title

A Modern Version of Relativism about Truth

Title variants
PL
Współczesna wersja relatywizmu dotyczącego prawdziwości
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
In the paper I describe John MacFarlane’s version of relativism about truth. I begin by discussing Twardowski’s (1900) and Kokoszynska’s (1948; 1951) arguments against relativism. They think – just as Haack does (see 2011) – that sentences may be relatively true, if they are incomplete, but once they are completed they become true (or false) absolutely. MacFarlane distinguishes between nonindexical contextualism (which was anticipated by Kokoszynska (sic!)) and relativism which requires the introduction of the context of assessment. According to him only the view which postulates double-indexed (to contexts of utterance and to contexts of assessments) truth is able to explain disagreement in subjective domains and contradicting intuitions about the truth-value of future-contingents.
Journal
Year
Volume
19
Issue
Pages
43-53
Physical description
Contributors
  • Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-927 Warsaw, Poland, j.odrowaz@uw.edu.pl
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.cejsh-4a31eaef-2054-4f80-b2cd-977a84666941
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.