MEANING-CONSTITUTIVE INFERENCES

• Authors: Drobňák Matej
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

A traditional objection to inferentialism states that not all inferences can be meaning-constitutive and therefore inferentialism has to comprise an analytic-synthetic distinction. As a response, Peregrin argues that meaning is a matter of inferential rules and only the subset of all the valid inferences for which there is a widely shared corrective behaviour corresponds to rules and so determines meaning. Unfortunately, Peregrin does not discuss what counts as “widely shared”. In the paper, the author argues for an empirical plausibility of Peregrin’s proposal. The aim of the paper is to show that we can find examples of meaning-constitutive linguistic action, which sustain Peregrin’s response. The idea is supported by examples of meaning modulation. If Peregrin is right, then we should be able to find specific meaning modulations in which a new meaning is publicly available and modulated in such a way that it has a potential to be widely shared. The author believes that binding modulations – a specific type of meaning modulations – satisfy this condition.

Keywords

EN

INFERENTIALISM; MEANING; CONSTITUTIVE INFERENCES; MODULATION; PEREGRIN

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2017
• Volume: 24
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 85 – 104

Contributors

author

Drobňák Matej

• Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences, University of Hradec Králové, Náměstí Svobody 331, 500 02 Hradec Králové, Czech Republic