OBJECTION TO RAILTON’S FULL-INFORMATION ANALYSIS OF NON-MORAL VALUE

• Authors: Zhuang Xuanpu
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

This paper presents an objection to Peter Railton’s full-information account of non-moral value. According to this account, if an idealized individual A who is fully rational and has full information wants the non-idealized A to desire X, then X is good for A. Those desires like X are called objective interests. Railton’s analysis holds that non-moral values are constituted by natural facts that are independent of subjective opinions. I argue that it is hard for the full-information analysis to achieve all its goals. My discussion focuses on intrinsic interests -those good for an individual without reference to any other objective interests. I attempt to show that either it is hard for the full-information account to give a normative force on individuals, or the account is circular. The conclusion I reach is moderate: in its current version, the full-information analysis of non-moral value cannot explain the link between the normative and the empirical.

Keywords

EN

PETER RAILTON; MORAL REALISM; NORMATIVITY; FULL-INFORMATION ANALYSIS

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2025
• Volume: 32
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 29 –41

Contributors

author

Zhuang Xuanpu

• School of Philosophy, Zhejiang University, 866 Yuhangtang Rd, Hangzhou, 310058, P.R. China

• https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4635-1925

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2025.32102