LAUDAN, INTUITION AND NORMATIVE NATURALISM

• Authors: Sankey Howard
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The aim of this paper is to document Laudan’s rejection of the appeal to intuition in the context of his development of normative naturalism. At one point in the development of his methodological thinking, Laudan appealed to pre-analytic intuitions, which might be employed to identify episodes in the history of science against which theories of scientific methodology are to be tested. However, Laudan came to reject this appeal to intuitions, and rejected this entire approach to the evaluation of a theory of method. This is an important stage in the development of his normative naturalist meta-methodology.

Keywords

EN

EPISTEMIC NORMATIVITY; NORMATIVE NATURALISM; LAUDAN

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2020
• Volume: 27
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 437 – 445

Contributors

author

Sankey Howard

• School of Historical and Philosophical Studies, University of Melbourne, Parkville, Victoria, Australia 3010

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27402