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2021 | 14 | 1 | 88 - 99

Article title

TRACES OF ARISTOTLE IN MARTIN LUTHER’S THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

Content

Title variants

Languages of publication

EN

Abstracts

EN
Martin Luther is generally considered a stark critic of Aristotle and, even more so, the medieval Aristotelianism of his age. Our article explores the development of Luther’s appraisal of Aristotle’s thought throughout his career with a special emphasis on the topic of theological anthropology. We will distinguish between the fundamental anthropological paradigms based on their situatedness – vertically, coram Deo, and horizontally, coram hominibus. The imago dei (Greek: eikon tou theou) doctrine will be closely examined as Luther’s essential component of his doctrine of the human being, and ethical as well as social implications will be drawn from his emphases. Aristotle’s philosophical heritage will be contrasted with Luther’s views on human will, conscience, sin, concupiscence, and divine grace. Our thesis is that, owing to Luther’s excessive reliance on God’s sovereignty and omnipotence, innate human capacities are diminished to the point of insignificance. This makes Luther’s anthropology pessimistic in regards to human capacities to do well. Questions of moral responsibility, the goodness of creation (including human reason), and the meaningfulness of human moral struggles are examined in the last section of our paper.

Year

Volume

14

Issue

1

Pages

88 - 99

Physical description

Contributors

  • Plekhanov Russian University of Economics, Department of State Legal and Criminal Law Disciplines, 36 Stremyannyi Pereulok, 115093, Moscow, Russia

References

Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.cejsh-615723b8-75ce-4d2d-9801-7ae40474ce00
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