PL EN


2011 | 2 | 1 | 259-273
Article title

Doświadczenie i eksperyment w sztuce

Authors
Content
Title variants
EN
Experience and Experiment in Art
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
A significant impediment to the study of perceptual consciousness is our dependence on simplistic ideas about what experience is like. This is a point that has been made by Wittgenstein, and by philosophers working in the Phenomenological Tradition, such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Importantly, it is an observation that has been brought to the fore in recent discussions of consciousness among philosophers and cognitive scientists who have come to feel the need for a more rigorous phenomenology of experience. The central thought of this paper is that art can make a needed contribution to the study of perceptual consciousness. The work of some artists can teach us about perceptual consciousness by furnishing us with the opportunity to have a special kind of reflective experience. In this way, art can be a tool for phenomenological investigation. The paper has three parts. First, I present what I call the problem of the transparency of experience. This is a problem for philosophy, for art, and for cognitive science. Second, I present an alternative conception of experience as a mode of interactive engagement with the environment. Finally, against the background of this conception, I discuss, briefly, the work of the sculptors Richard Serra and Tony Smith.
Keywords
Contributors
author
  • Institute for Cognitive and Brain Sciences Department of Philosophy Moses Hall 2390 University of California Berkeley CA 94720-2390, USA, noe@berkeley.edu
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.cejsh-685fbb81-93bf-41c3-875f-3aa0697ee3ad
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.