MODAL EMPIRICISM AND KNOWLEDGE OF DE RE POSSIBILITIES: A CRITIQUE OF ROCA-ROYES’ ACCOUNT

• Authors: Duško Preleviċ
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Accounting for our knowledge of de re modalities is probably the main reason why the proponents of modal empiricism think that their view should be preferred to modal rationalism. In this paper, the author addresses Sonia Roca-Royes’ account, which is taken to be a representative modal empiricist view, in order to show that modal empiricism faces serious problems even in explaining our knowledge of possibility de re, something which seems to be the easiest thing to explain on this view. He argues that Roca-Royes’ account does not prove what she claims it does, that it can hardly be articulated in a non-redundant way, and that her account of our knowledge of possibility de re can hardly be reconciled with the essentiality of origin principle, to which modal empiricists sometimes appeal while criticizing the modal rationalist account.

Keywords

EN

DE RE MODAL KNOWLEDGE; MODAL EMPIRICISM; MODAL EPISTEMOLOGY; MODAL RATIONALISM; ROCA-ROYES SONIA

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2015
• Volume: 22
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 488 – 498

Contributors

author

Duško Preleviċ

• Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Čika Ljubina 18-20, 11000 Belgrade, Serbia