SKEPTICIZMUS A NEGATÍVNY DOGMATIZMUS V MYSLENÍ HOMÉRA A XENOFANA

• Authors: Dariusz Kubok

Title variants

EN

Scepticism and negative dogmatism in Homer and Xenophanes

• Languages of publication: SK

Abstracts

EN

The article presents selected aspects of Xenophanes’ philosophy (especially B 34 and B 18 Diels-Kranz) in the light of Homer’s thought. First of all, scepticism should be distinguished from negative dogmatism. Therefor the author will use the term “scepticism” (from Greek skeptomai – explore, examine, consider, think) in accordance with Sextus Empiricus’ typology. In his Outlines of Pyrrhonism (I, 1-2) he distinguishes three forms of philosophy: (1) dogmatic (dogmatike), characteristic of those, who claim to have found the truth; (2) academic (akademaike), defined as negative dogmatism denying the possibility of finding the truth; (3) sceptic (skeptike), which involve a persistent search for truth. The main aim of the paper is to compare Homer’s attitudes with those of Xenophanes as far as the distinction between scepticism and negative dogmatism is concerned.

Keywords

EN

HOMER; XENOPHANES; SCEPTICISM; NEGATIVE DOGMATISM; KNOWLEDGE

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filozofia (Philosophy)
• Year: 2014
• Volume: 69
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 223 – 235

Contributors

author

Dariusz Kubok

• Instytut Filozofii Uniwersytet Sląski, Bankowa 11, 40-007 Katowice, Poland