FAULTLESS DISAGREEMENT CONTEXTUALISM

• Authors: Davies Alex
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

It is widely assumed that the possibility of faultless disagreement is to be explained by the peculiar semantics and/or pragmatics of special kinds of linguistic construction. For instance, if A asserts “o is F” and B asserts this sentence’s denial, A and B can disagree faultlessly only if they employ the right kind of predicate as their “F”. In this paper, I present an argument against this assumption. Focusing on the special case when the expression of interest is a predicate, I present a series of examples in which the same pairs of sentences are employed, but in different contexts. In some cases, we get an impression of faultless disagreement and in some cases we don’t. I identify a pattern across these contexts and conclude that faultless disagreement is made possible, not by a special kind of predicate, but instead by a special kind of context.

Keywords

EN

DISAGREEMENT; FAULTLESS DISAGREEMENT; CONTEXTUALISM

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2021
• Volume: 28
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 557 – 580

Contributors

author

Davies Alex

• University of Tartu, Ülikooli 18, 50090 Tartu, Estonia

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28304