ON TWO UNDERAPPRECIATED MOTIFS OF QUINE’S NATURALISM; OR, QUINE ON REALITY AND NATURALISTIC PHILOSOPHY

• Authors: Hubálek Michal
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

This essay deals with two often underappreciated Quinean naturalistic motifs. The first motif concerns the metaphysical status of reality under naturalism, by examining what can be viewed as Quine’s attempt to dissolve realism and idealism into each other; the second motif concerns the meta-philosophical dimension of naturalized epistemology. I aim to demonstrate that Quine’s way of approaching these two motifs turns out to be not only complementary, but also highly indicative of his overall naturalistic outlooks as well as professional preferences. As a result, this essay re-assesses Quine’s influence on the development of naturalism and naturalistically conceived philosophy from the second half of the 20th century onwards.

Keywords

EN

QUINE; REALISM; NATURALISM; EPISTEMOLOGY; NATURALISTIC PHILOSOPHY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2025
• Volume: 32
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 224 – 259

Contributors

author

Hubálek Michal

• Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences, University of Hradec Králové, Rokitanského 62/26, 500 03 Hradec Králové 3, Czech Republic

• https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9089-3556

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2025.32205