Neutralita pro Německo, anebo stabilizace východního bloku? Nový důkazní materiál o přípravě „Stalinovy nóty“ z roku 1952

• Authors: Peter Ruggenthaler

Title variants

EN

Neutrality for Germany or Stabilizing the Eastern Bloc? New Evidence on the Decision-Making Process of the Stalin Note of 1952

• Languages of publication: CS

Abstracts

EN

The Stalin Note of 10 March 1952 has long been an intensively debated, even fi ercely contested, topic among Cold War historians. The core of this debate was constituted by the question of whether Stalin’s proposal to the Western powers to allow the unifi cation of Germany in exchange for its neutrality was made in earnest. If this was the case, then the United States, the United Kingdom, and France could be at least partly blamed for refusing the proposal and thus for endorsing the continued division of Germany. The author of this article has carried out extensive research in various Soviet archives to trace the origins of the Note and to reveal its true purpose in the overall context of Soviet policy towards Germany. By doing so, he has dispelled some of the widespread myths surrounding the nature of the process of making Soviet foreign policy in the last years of Stalin’s life. He clearly demonstrates that regarding Germany, no decision was made by the Politburo without the approval of Stalin, even during his long absences from the capital. He also shows that although the origins of the Stalin Note can be traced to East Germany and Walter Ulbricht, the East German leadership played no significant role in wording the note itself. Based on his extensive research, the author concludes that far from being a serious plan to achieve the unification and neutralization of Germany, the Stalin Note instead provided a comfortable cover for the integration of East Germany into the Eastern bloc. While ostentatiously criticizing the remilitarization of West Germany and the Western reluctance to compromise, the Soviet leader had decided long before receiving the answer of the Western powers to his note that the only tenable course for East Germany was the building of socialism and full absorption of the country into the Eastern bloc. Thus, the Stalin Note cannot be considered anything more than a propaganda manoeuvre, although very well executed as far as deception of the general public was concerned.

Discipline

• HISTORY: HISTORY

• Publisher: Institute of Contemporary History, Czech Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Soudobé dějiny (Contemporary History)
• Year: 2012
• Issue: 3-4
• Pages: 435-456

Contributors

author

Peter Ruggenthaler

• Soudobé dějiny, redakce, Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR, v.v.i., Vlašská 9, 118 40 Praha 1, Czech Republic