HORWICH ON THE VALUE OF TRUTH

• Authors: Lee D. Byeong
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

On the normativity objection to Horwich’s minimalist theory of truth, his theory fails to capture the value of truth. In response to this objection, he argues that his minimalist theory of truth is compatible with the value of truth. On his view, the concept of truth is not constitutively normative, but the value of true beliefs can be explained instead by the belief-truth norm that we ought to want our beliefs to be true, and the value of true beliefs expressed in this norm is a moral value. I accept a deflationary theory of truth, according to which truth is too thin a concept to be constituted by any substantial norms. Thus I agree that the concept of truth is not constitutively normative. In this paper, however, I argue that the alleged value of true beliefs can be better explained in terms of epistemic normativity rather than moral normativity.

Keywords

EN

HORWICH PAUL; VALUE OF TRUTH; MORAL VALUES; EPISTEMIC VALUES

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2020
• Volume: 27
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 263 – 279

Contributors

author

Lee D. Byeong

• Sungkyunkwan University, Department of Philosophy, 25-2, Sungkyunkwan-ro, Jongno-gu, Seoul, Republic of Korea

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27204