CASTING A SHADOW ON LEWIS’S THEORY OF CAUSATION

• Authors: Sayan Erdinç
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

First I present a puzzle involving two opaque objects and a shadow cast on the ground. After I offer a solution to this puzzle by identifying which of the objects is causally responsible for the shadow, I argue that this case poses a counterexample to David Lewis’s latest counterfactual account of causation, known as his influence theory. Along the way, I discuss preemption, over determination, absence causation, and trumping preemption.

Keywords

EN

ABSENCE CAUSATION; THEORY OF CAUSATION; OVERDETERMINATION; PREEMPTIVE PREVENTION

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2019
• Volume: 26
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 287 – 297

Contributors

author

Sayan Erdinç

• Philosophy Department, Middle East Technical University, Dumlupinar Bulvari, 1, 06800 Ankara, Turkey

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2019.26206