POJEM VERZUS KONCEPCIA SPRAVODLIVOSTI V ANALYTICKEJ FILOZOFII PRÁVA (2. časť)

• Authors: Neština Marek

Title variants

EN

Concept vs. conception of justice in analytic philosophy of law (2nd part)

• Languages of publication: SK

Abstracts

EN

The article is a continuation of the author’s contribution Concept vs. Conception of Justice in Analytic Philosophy of Law (Filozofia 2022/4). It focuses on explaining polysemy as a kind of linguistic indeterminacy that constitutes one of the main reasons why courts come to interpret legal texts. The study discusses polysemy from the perspective of the theory of language used by A. Marmor in his theory of interpretation. The author shows the limits of semantic analysis in law and the role of normative presuppositions, which influence the final outcome of judicial decision-making not only in terms of content, but are also important for the choice of formal means that are applied in the context of this decision-making.

Keywords

EN

CONCEPTION; CONSTITUTION; LAW; MARMOR; POLYSEMY; SEMANTICS

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy, Slovak Academy of Sciences
• Journal: Filozofia (Philosophy)
• Year: 2022
• Volume: 77
• Issue: 5
• Pages: 339 – 356

Contributors

author

Neština Marek

• Univerzita Komenského v Bratislave, Evanjelická bohoslovecká fakulta, Inštitút kontextuálnej teológie, Bartókova 8, 811 02 Bratislava, Slovak Republic

• https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2854-5112

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2022.77.5.3