FREGE ON IDENTITY AND CO-REFERENCE

• Authors: Corazza Eros
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In “Über Sinn und Bedeutung” (1892) Frege raises a problem concerning identity statements of the form a=b and he criticizes the view he holds in the Begriffsschrift (1879, § 8). In building on a suggestion by Perry (2001/12, ch. 7) I will show how Frege’s Begriffsschrift account can be rescued and how Frege’s 1892 criticism of his Begriffsschrift’s position somewhat miss the point. Furthermore, the Begriffsschrift’s view can be developed to account in quite an elegant way to the so-called Frege’s Puzzle without committing to the sense/reference (Sinn/Bedeutung) distinction Frege introduces in “Über Sinn und Bedeutung”. To do so we have, though, to give up the idea that all the relevant information conveyed by the utterance of a simple sentence is encapsulated into a single content. I will show of that this can be done in adopting a Perry-style pluri-propositionalist model of communication.

Keywords

EN

FREGE; PERRY; IDENTITY CO-REFERENCE

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2022
• Volume: 29
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 26 - 46

Contributors

author

Corazza Eros

• The University of the Basque Country UPV-EHU, Donostia, Spain

• https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8074-7777

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2022.29102