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2020 | 27 | 4 | 539 - 555
Article title

DEFENDING THE GOOD DOG PICTURE OF VIRTUES

Content
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
I consider and reject a specific criticism advanced by Korsgaard against virtue ethics and epistemology when these are conceived with the help of what she calls the image of the “Good Dog.” I consider what virtue ethics and epistemology would look like if the Good Dog picture of virtues were largely correct. I argue that attention to the features that make Korsgaard undermine the usefulness of virtues when conceived along the lines of the Good Dog picture reveals the opposite of what she claims. On the Good Dog picture, virtue ethics and epistemology are seen as more promising approaches to rationality than Korsgaard’s own advocacy of reflection.
Contributors
  • Institutul de Cercetare al Universității din București (ICUB), Str. Dr. Dimitrie Brândză nr. 1, Bucureşti, Romania 060102, andrei.marasoiu@icub.unibuc.ro
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.cejsh-82f7d02b-54c1-441d-8dac-b932f5c91e24
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