DEFENDING THE GOOD DOG PICTURE OF VIRTUES

• Authors: Mărăşoiu Andrei Ionuţ
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

I consider and reject a specific criticism advanced by Korsgaard against virtue ethics and epistemology when these are conceived with the help of what she calls the image of the “Good Dog.” I consider what virtue ethics and epistemology would look like if the Good Dog picture of virtues were largely correct. I argue that attention to the features that make Korsgaard undermine the usefulness of virtues when conceived along the lines of the Good Dog picture reveals the opposite of what she claims. On the Good Dog picture, virtue ethics and epistemology are seen as more promising approaches to rationality than Korsgaard’s own advocacy of reflection.

Keywords

EN

INTELLECTUAL VIRTUE; MORAL VIRTUE; RATIONALITY; KORSGAARD

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2020
• Volume: 27
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 539 - 555

Contributors

author

Mărăşoiu Andrei Ionuţ

• Institutul de Cercetare al Universității din București (ICUB), Str. Dr. Dimitrie Brândză nr. 1, Bucureşti, Romania 060102

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2020.27408