O SKEPTIKOVI KRIPKENSTEINOVI A JEHO VPLYVE NA DISKUSIU O NEURČITOSTI PRÁVA
On sceptic Kripkenstein and his influence on discussion about indeterminacy of law
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The paper deals with a study about rules and private language in Wittgenstein written by Saul Kripke and its influence on argumentation leading to scepticism about possibility of rule-following. Kripkenstein’s sceptical paradox and its solution as to Kripke are formulated in the first part of the paper. Kripkenstein is confronted with Wittgenstein in the second part of the paper. Author’s critical remarks as to Kripkenstein may be summed up in the following way: First of all, the aim of Wittgenstein’s remarks on rules was to describe the agreement, not disagreement, as to the use of language (rules). Hence Kripkenstein ignored the aim of remarks. Secondly, „to follow the rule blindly” in Wittgenstein, he points to the end of justification and to the reflexivity of the reaction, not to the arbitrariness of the reaction as Kripkenstein invokes. Thirdly, Kripkenstein fell pray to a craving for generality and he was searching for the fact of meaning as a mental state. However, Wittgenstein warned us of it. The second part involves also the critic of Kripke provided by G. Baker and P.M.S. Hacker. Argumentation of legal scholars that is influenced by Kripke (or even the misunderstanding of Kripke) comprises the third part of the paper. J. Boyle and A. Marmor are shown as the typical examples. The first one, J. Boyle, even misinterprets Kripke as he claims that the Wittgensteinian view on language is relativistic. This part also includes the contra argumentation against sceptical reading of Wittgenstein. Hence, the paper confutes scepticism in modality of rule-following scepticism identified by Kripke.
534 – 548
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