EPISTEMIC-PRACTICAL DILEMMA FOR EVIDENTIALISM

• Authors: Lee Byeong D
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

There are cases in which epistemic rationality seems to conflict with practical rationality. Evidentialists such as Parfit, Shah, Skorupski and Way deny that there are practical reasons for belief. On their view, the only genuine normative reasons for belief are epistemic reasons, and so the alleged practical reasons for belief are the wrong kind of reasons for belief. But I argue in this paper that the evidentialists can still face a genuine dilemma between epistemic and practical rationality which cannot be resolved on the grounds that the alleged practical reasons for belief are the wrong kind of reasons for belief.

Keywords

EN

EPISTEMIC RATIONALITY; PRACTICAL RATIONALITY; EVIDENTIALISM

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2024
• Volume: 31
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 95 – 113

Contributors

author

Lee Byeong D

• Sungkyunkwan University, Department of Philosophy, 25-2, Sungkyunkwan-ro, Jongno-gu, Seoul, Republic of Korea

• https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7080-6702

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2024.31201