DISTINCTIVE RATIONALITY OF INTENTIONS

• Authors: David Botting
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In this paper the author intend to defend Broome’s cognitivist view that reduces practical normativity to theoretical normativity, but argue that this leaves unaccounted for distinctively practical norms that the author seeks to capture as a system of local obligations to have particular intentions. The krasia requirement dictates what obligations we have relative to the normative beliefs that we have but does not tell us what intentions it is rational to have all-things-considered.

Keywords

EN

BROOME; COGNITIVISM; KRASIA; RATIONALITY

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2013
• Volume: 20
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 507 – 526

Contributors

author

David Botting

• Instituto de Filosofia da Linguagem, Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Av. de Berna, 26 - 4º piso, 1069-061 Lisboa, Portugal