COMPULSION, IGNORANCE, AND INVOLUNTARY ACTION: AN ARISTOTELIAN ANALYSIS

• Authors: Yi Huiyuhl
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Some remarks in the Eudemian Ethics and the Nichomachean Ethics indicate that the voluntariness of actions is significantly related to compulsion and ignorance. According to a plausible interpretation, these remarks suggest that if an agent performs an action under compulsion or due to ignorance of some relevant facts, then she does so involuntarily. An objection to this interpretation with regard to compulsion is that an agent can voluntarily do what she is compelled to do. With regard to ignorance, one might object that it is necessary to clarify the proper range of relevant facts when considering whether an action performed out of ignorance is involuntary. In this paper, I develop two principles that align with the view that compulsion and ignorance are sufficient conditions for involuntary actions, while accommodating potential counterexamples and complications.

Keywords

EN

ARISTOTLE; COMPULSION; EUDEMIAN ETHICS; NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS; IGNORANCE; INVOLUNTARY ACTION

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2024
• Volume: 31
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 367 – 387

Contributors

author

Yi Huiyuhl

• Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology, School of Liberal Arts, 50 Unist-gil, Ulju-gun, Ulsan, 44919, Republic of Korea

• https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2221-6406

Identifiers

DOI

https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2024.31402