PL EN


Journal
2012 | 12 | 4(19) | 117-130
Article title

Wszechwiedza Boża a problem zła z perspektywy teizmu otwartego

Selected contents from this journal
Title variants
EN
DIVINE OMNISCIENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF OPEN THEISM
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
In the first part of the article, I present the argument for theological fatalism consisting in the thesis that if God has an infallible knowledge of future contingents, then whatever happens in the world happens necessarily. Next, I discuss the open theism view, whose rejection of theological fatalism rests on the claim that God does not know future contingents in advance. In the second part of the paper, I analyze the open theism view in the context of the evidential argument from evil. The evidential argument from evil says that the occurrence of great and pointless suffering in the world makes the existence of God very improbable. The open theism view implies that since God does not know the future contingents (great and pointless evils included), the occurrence of such evils does not compromise his omnipotence or his benevolence, and, hence, it does not make his existence improbable. In the last part of the article, I make some critical remarks on the theodicy of open theism recently put forth by William Hasker and I emphasize that this theodicy is based on axiological assumptions which are not evident enough in themselves.
Journal
Year
Volume
12
Issue
Pages
117-130
Physical description
Contributors
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.cejsh-92c6dbc1-d8e5-442e-88fa-bd3a26bb7b1c
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