PL EN


2010 | 38 | 3 | 49-68
Article title

Zagadnienie współzależności aktów intuicyjnych w fenomenologii Husserla i Ingardena

Title variants
EN
THE MUTUAL DEPENDENCE OF INTUITIVE ACTS IN HUSSERL`S AND INGARDEN`S PHENOMENOLOGY
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
Within the system created by Husserl and Ingarden the issue of intuitive acts of consciousness is a fundamental methodological condition that allows the foundation of phenomenology as a science. This paper presents some of the necessary relations between empirical and eidetic intuition that emerge from Husserl’s and Ingarden’s understanding phenomenology. At first I formulate the thesis that an act of empirical intuition is a condition of possibility for eidetic intuition, and vice versa, eidetic intuition is a condition of fulfilling empirical intuition. I demonstrate the first dependence by analyzing some intuitive moments referring to Ingarden’s description of the cognition of what he calls pure qualities, that exhausts the range of materially a priori phenomena, and further to Husserl’s understanding of pure essences, which exhausts the issue of cognition of formally a priori phenomena. In both cases empirical intuition appears to be necessary for the fulfillment of eidetic intuition. Next, I turn the reverse implication, that simple empirical intuition also relies on eidetic intuition. I describe Ingarden’s notion of a constitutive nature, considered as a condition of what I call noematic consistency in noetic fluency. Considering two possible ways of understanding the constitutive nature (either as only intended or as fully given) I notice that in each particular object presented in an unrepeatable view that is a part of an empirical intuition there are certain universal moments, such as its constitutive qualities, which are strictly unchangeable and can be perceived in no other way than within the act of eidetic intuition. Finally, I formulate the quite controversial thesis that empirical and eidetic intuitions are nothing more than two moments of one act of consciousness, rather than two separate acts.
Year
Volume
38
Issue
3
Pages
49-68
Physical description
Contributors
  • Uniwersytet Łódzki, Instytut Filozofii, ul.Kopcińskiego 16/18, 99-232 Łódź, Poland
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.cejsh-95fbe9c0-f14a-4991-b09f-84e86fb4ba6f
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.